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Political democracy depends not only on the economic and social 
conditions but also on the design of political institutions. 
-James March & Johan Olsen 
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A Neo-Institutional Analysis of Opposition Structures in the 
South African Parliament 
South Africa's negotiated parliamentary system is a hybrid of political 
institutions based upon different models of democracy. Theoretically, there are two 
broad models from which South Africa's system draws its characteristics: 
consociational democracy, and majoritarian democracy. Both models of democracy 
bestow certain characteristics on the South African system which affect how opposition 
politics operate within the system. 
Concern has been raised about the ability of opposition politics to function in, 
and contribute to, the operation of the South African Parliament. The many 
consociational characteristics of the South African system may have created opposition 
structures which are emaciated of their duties, rights and responsibilities. This 
concern prompted an investigation into the operation of the opposition structures of the 
South African Parliament. 
The basis of the neo-Institutional analysis is the premise that the behaviour of 
actors within a system (in this case, Members of Parliament within Parliament) is 
shaped by the rules and structure of that system. As such, the opposition behaviour of 
parties and individuals in the South African Parliament is shaped by the rules and 
structure of Parliament. 
This paper first presents the theoretical considerations of a neo-Institutionalist 
examination. The theory is explored by examining the literature of rational choice 
theorists as well as Historical Institutionalists. Secondly, an examination is conducted 
of the different models of democracy-and the attributes which each contribute to the 
South African system. Within this section, the concept of opposition is developed. 
The analysis of the South African Parliamentary institutions of opposition is conducted 
by examining the two basic documents which proscribe the rules of procedure for the 
institutions of Parliament: the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the 
Standing Rules of the National Assembly. The theoretical expectations of behaviour 
are checked against the empirical reality of Parliamentary behaviour. This study 
examines data collected from the Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard) 
regarding individual and party participation in debate, questions and interpellations, 
committees, and Cabinet. 
The data support the contention of the analysis that whether it is by virtue of 
the consociational nature of Cabinet, or the over-representation of smaller parties in 
National Assembly debate, opposition politics are an important part of the 
Parliamentary process in South Africa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
South Africa's parliamentary system is an interesting hybrid of political 
institutions based upon different models of democracy. It represents a blend 
of characteristics of the British style Westminster Parliamentary system and a 
co-operative consociational governing system. 
The traditional Westminster parliamentary system is characterised by 
strict party discipline; a cabinet; a shadow cabinet; and, a rather sharp 
division in the chamber. The Westminster system operates under the 
majoritarian system of democracy where the majority rules, a minority 
opposes within the structures of Parliament, and minority rights are 
protected. The consociational system is characterised by a federal government 
structure with strong regional powers, as well as consultative power-sharing 
and negotiated policy development at the national legislative level. 
In formulating South Africa's parliamentary hybrid, the negotiators 
and writers of the Interim Constitution have created an interesting situation 
vis-a-vis the status and nature of parliamentary opposition. 
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South Africa's parliamentary system is an eclectic combination of 
attributes from the dominant models of democratic governance. Under the 
current dispensation, there are no provisions for a formal institutionalised 
opposition. The South African government system is based upon a cabinet 
form of government, typical of the Westminster system; yet Cabinet procedure 
is constitutionally mandated to act in a consociational style. Additionally, the 
members of the cabinet are Members of Parliament who are responsible to the 
parliament for the performance and conduct of their portfolios. As such, 
cabinet ministers can be questioned in Parliament about their portfolios. 
South Africa's parliament, however, lacks the formal opposition structures 
which are traditionally used to challenge the government and hold the 
ministers accountable!. There is no officially recognised opposition, no shadow 
cabinet, and no official recognition of the rights and responsibilities of the 
smaller parties. 
This situation within the South African Parliament has led to some 
concern about the vitality of opposition politics in the new South Africa. Noted 
academics, such as Ian Shapiro, have commented on the possible detrimental 
effects that this lack of parliamentary structures may have on the operation of 
1 Such formal opposition structures include, but are not limited to, rights of 
participation in debate and a formal question period for Government Ministers. 
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parliamentary opposition in South Africa2. A reading of South Africa's 
Interim Constitution could lead to the belief that opposition parties are 
emaciated of their powers and responsibilities. Such Constitutional provision 
as Section 433 seemingly provide for extremely strict party discipline, which 
would limit the ability of individual members to cross the floor to challenge 
the policy of their party elite4• Additionally, the South African Constitution 
does not provide for any opposition structures. Theoretically, therefore, the 
existence of opposition in South Africa's parliament could be threatened. 
The political institutions of the South Africa Parliament, on the other 
hand, may tell a different story. The rules of these institutions, the 
Constitution and the Standing Rules of Procedure, are what shape and define 
the actions of the actors who will operate within the institutions, the Members 
of Parliament. Therefore, a true reflection of the nature of opposition politics 
in the new South African Parliament should not come from institutional 
comparisons to other countries (or even past dispensations). Instead, a new 
analysis should be conducted on the institutions of the present system. 
2 See Ian Shapiro and Courtney Jung, South Africa's Negotiated Transition: 
Democracy and Opposition in Comparative Perspective (Institution for Social and Policy 
Studies Working Paper No. 1052, Yale University, 1994). 
3 Section 43(b) of the South African Constitution states: "A member of the National 
Assembly shall vacate his or her seat if he or she ceases to be a member of the party which 
nominated him or her as a member of the National Assembly" (Republic of South Africa, 
Minister of Constitutional Development Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, {B 
212D-93 (GA)], p. 26). 
4 The term 'crossing the floor' is used to refer to the act of a Member of Parliament 
voting against his or her own party. The term describes the literal action (historical and 
occasionally present day) of a Member crossing the aisle, or the floor, to the other side of the 
chamber to vote with the opposing party. 
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Effectively, the question must be asked if the institutions of South Africa's 
Parliament, in and of themselves, allow for opposition, both in theory and in 
practice. 
This essay will seek to answer the above stated question. It will 
examine, from a neo-institutionalist perspective, the nature of political 
opposition in the new South African parliament. In doing so, this essay will 
lay the neo-institutional foundation for analysis, and detail how the rules of 
the institutions of Parliament will influence the behaviours of the actors 
within the institutions. Then this essay will examine the different definitions 
and conceptualisations of political opposition which are offered by scholars of 
the subject. 
The main body of this essay will examine the various institutions of the 
South African parliament, and analyse how the rules of these institutions 
shape the nature of the opposition. In operationalising the rules of the 
institutions of parliament, this essay will also formulate and examine some 
statistics about the actual practice of opposition politics in South Africa. 
Following this empirical analysis, this essay will compare South African 
opposition structures to the concepts of opposition which are examined in the 
third chapter. After examining how South Africa fits into a comparative 
analysis of opposition politics, the conclusion of this essay will show the 
important role of institutions in shaping the behaviour of opposition politics in 




This paper will present an analysis of parliamentary opposition in South 
Africa from a neo-institutional perspective. In order to do so, it is first 
necessary to define the neo-institutionalist approach, and to present the 
theoretical framework. 
The neo-institutional perspective is not new. Instead, it represents a 
rediscovery in economic and political studies of the affect on systems of law, 
contracts, hierarchies, standard operating procedures, professional codes and 
social norms. Institutionalism is an attempt to illuminate how political 
struggles "are mediated by the institutional setting in which [they] take 
place."5 In analysing the institutional setting, generally neo-institutionalists 
work with a definition of institutions which includes both formal organisations 
5G. John Ikenbery, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign 
Economic Policy," in G. John Ikenbery, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., The 
State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), 
. 222-3. 
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and informal rules and procedures that structure behaviour. In his book, 
Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and 
France, Peter Hall sets forth a widely accepted definition of institutions which 
includes "the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standing operating 
practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units 
of the polity and economy ."6 
March and Olsen describe how institutions are fit into the analysis of 
politics within the neo-institutional framework. As they point out: 
The ideas [of institutionalism] de-emphasise the dependence of 
the polity on society in favor of an interdependence between 
relatively autonomous social and political institutions; they de-
emphasise the simple primacy of micro processes and efficient 
histories in favor of relatively complex processes and historical 
inefficiency; they de-emphasise metaphors of choice and allocative 
outcomes in favor of other logics of action and the centrality of 
meaning and symbolic action. 7 
It is important to note, however, that while institutions are important, the 
contention of Institutionalism is "that institutions constrain and refract politics 
but they are never the sole 'cause' of outcomes .. .Instead, they point to the ways 
that institutions structure [political] battles and in so doing, influence their 
outcomes."B 
6Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and 
France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 19. 
7James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational 
Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review, 78, no. 3 (Sept. 1994), p. 738. 
8Sven Steinmo and Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics," in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: 
Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), p. 3. 
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Within the school of new or Neo-Institutionalism, there are two different 
approaches: rational choice Institutionalism and historical Institutionalism. 9 
Both approaches are concerned "with the question of how institutions shape 
political strategies and influence political outcomes."10 However, the two 
approaches are based on different assumptions which have important effects 
on how politics and institutions are studied. 
Rational choice scholars, such as Bates, Levi, North, and Shepsle,11 
examine the "strategic context"12 that institutions impose on rational self-
interested behaviour. When the rules (institutions) of rational choice games 
change, the actors within the system will change their behaviour in order to 
use the rules to maximise their own self-interest. As such, rational choice 
Institutionalism concentrates on political institutions because these 
institutions define and constrain the strategies of the actors within the system 
as these actors pursue their own interests. 
Historical institutionalists, such as Berger, Hall, Katzenstein and 
Skocpol, 13 generally find rational choice Institutionalism overly simplistic14 for 
9The term "Historical Institutionalism" is borrowed from Theda Skocpol, and is widely 
used to distinguish this variant of institutionalism from rational choice institutionalism. 
lOSteinmo and Thelen, p. 7. 
11See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Robert H Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the 
Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Rural Kenya (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
12Steinmo and Thelen, p. 7. 
13See Suzanne Berger's "Introduction," in Suzanne Berger, ed., Organizing Interests 
in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Peter Hall, Governing 
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two main reasons. On the one hand, historical institutionalists are sceptical 
about the ability of a political actor to be an all-knowing rational maximiser. 
Instead, political actors are viewed as rule-following "satisficers."15 In other 
words, the view of historical Institutionalism is that people do not stop and 
examine every choice they make in their lives to figure which option would 
maximise their self interest. Instead, most actors, "most of the time, follow 
societally defined rules, even when so doing may not be directly in our self 
interests." 16 
The second divergence between rational choice and historical 
Institutionalism focuses on the issue of preferences and preference formation. 
Rational choice institutionalists view preferences at the level of assumptions, 
an input variable that will effect the strategy chosen to maximise self interest. 
Historical institutionalist argue that "not just strategies but also the goals 
(original emphasis) actors pursue are shaped by the institutional context."17 
Historical Institutionalism, therefore, views preferences and preference 
the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986); Peter Katzenstein's "Introduction," in Between Power and Plenty 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978); Theda Skocpol in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985). 
14Steinmo and Thelen, p. 7. 
15James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational 
Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (Sept. 1984):734-49. 
16Steinmo and Thelen, p. 8. 
17Steinmo and Thelen, p. 8. 
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formation as an endogenous variable of the system whereas rational choice 
institutionalists view them as exogenous inputs. 
This paper conducts its analysis from the Historical Institutionalist 
perspective. The Historical Institutionalist perspective is used to recognise 
that the rapid changes of South Africa's democratic transition must be seen as 
a catalyst for preference reformulation among South Africa's political actors. 
The transition in South Africa represents an adoption of new rules and 
institutions for the governance of the country. Such a radical shift from the 
apartheid policies of the past have helped to reshape the preferences of the 
major actors. Since these preferences are reshaped, they are endogenous 
variables and not exogenous givens. Recognising that the preferences of the 
actors have changed, Historical Institutionalism is the appropriate approach 
for this study. 
Operationalising the institutional perspective for the analysis of 
opposition in the South African Parliament, therefore, requires the analysis of 
parliamentary institutions, and the rules thereof. This paper will present an 
analysis of opposition within three parliamentary institutions: 1) Cabinet; 2) 
the National Assembly; and, 3) parliamentary committees. In order to 
examine these institutions, the rules (or operating procedures) of these 
institutions must be analysed. The primary documents for the analysis of 
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these institutions, then, are the Interim Constitution for the Republic of South 
Africa and the Standing Rules for the National Assembly. 
Using the institutional perspective will require analysing the 
behaviours of these actors within the institutions of Parliament. 
Consideration will also be given to the preferences and preference formation of 
the actors, and how the behaviour of the actors pursuing these preferences is 
affected by the institutions of Parliament. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CONCEPTS OF PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION 
The concept and role of political opposition within democratic 
governance are issues which are increasingly being raised in South Africa as 
the rules and institutions of South Africa's new dispensation are being shaped. 
A cursory examination of the literature on democracy shows that there is a 
wide range of opinion on what forms political opposition may take, and also the 
relative importance of the opposition in creating 'democratic' rule. 
This chapter will examine opinion of what constitutes an opposition, and 
how important that concept is within a democratic framework. Before any 
examination of the nature of opposition can be undertaken, it is important that 
the terms of reference and the definitions be explicit. This paper seeks to 
examine the role of opposition within the structures of government. Moreover, 
it seeks to limit the arena of such opposition to the legislative institutions. As 
such, this essay will examine parliamentary opposition at the national level. 
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Within this seemingly narrowly defined conceptualisation, there is a wide 
range of manoeuvrability. 
At the theoretical level there is debate on the concept and role of 
political opposition. Opinions and conceptualisations of opposition structures 
range from the highly institutionalised and structured opposition politics of the 
British Westminster (majoritarian) system to the consociational models of 
cooperational democracy. The nature of political opposition, and the role it 
should play within the political dispensation is closely related to the 
democratic theory, and the model thereof, under which a system is operating. 
The conceptualisation of opposition, since it is tied to the model of democracy, 
ought to be examined within the overall democratic model. 
There are two widely accepted models of democracy, from which the 
opposition conceptions were briefly described above. The first model is that of 
'majoritarian' democracy, whereby the legislative majority governs and the 
legislative minority opposes. Such opposition is entrenched institutionally, and 
is charged with the proposal of policy alternatives for government policy, 
criticism of government programmes, and a watchdog function to msure 
governmental integrity. The second democratic model is the consociational 
model where the majority rules with the minority. Such government is based 
upon the achievement of consensus among elites and power-sharing. These 
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two democratic model conceptualisations confer with them two different views 
of opposition and its role. These two different conceptualisations are at the 
polar extremes of what Shapiro and Jung term the "coalition/opposition 
continuum."18 
At one end of the continuum is the model sketched by Shapiro and Jung 
of majoritarian rule. The functional concerns of such an opposition are 
threefold: 
First, the prov1s1on of the institutional space for opposition is 
necessary to ensure that discontent and dissatisfaction can be 
directed at particular governments rather than at the democratic 
regime ... second opposition institutions matter, if the peaceful 
turnover of power from one elected government to another is the 
sine qua non of democratic politics as Huntington suggests ... Last, 
institutional arrangements that facilitate 'loyal' opposition 
perform important public-interest functions in democracies. 19 
At the other end of the continuum is Lijphart's notion of consociational 
democracy. The principles of consociational democracy are a proportional 
electoral system, institutionally structured power-sharing and a system of 
mutual vetoes among elites,20 or as Lijphart terms them, a "cartel of elites."21 
Lijphart writes that: 
18Jan Shapiro and Courtney Jung, South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy 
and Opposition in Comparative Perspective (Institution for Social and Policy Studies Working 
Paper No. 1052, Yale University, 1994), pp. 6-7. 
l9Shapiro and Jung, pp 4-5. The reference to Huntington is from Samuel Huntington, 
The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Oklahoma: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 267. 
20Shapiro and Jung, p. 6. 
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Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel 
designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture 
into a stable democracy.22 
Furthermore, Lijphart contends that: 
The essential characteristics of consociational democracy is not so 
much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate 
joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system.23 
Between the two continuum extremes, there are a wide range of possible 
opposition structures. Interestingly, there is no 'standard' or typical 
opposition. Although Robert Dahl does not develop a typical form of opposition, 
it should be noted that he does contend that: 
[T]he three great milestones in the development of democratic 
institutions [are] the right to participate in governmental 
decisions by casting a vote, the right to be represented, and the 
right of an organized opposition to appeal for votes against the 
government in elections and in parliament.24 
Although Dahl himself does set the wide ranged criteria above, he concludes 
his book by noting that within these criteria: 
First there exist a great variety of different patterns of opposition 
in democratic systems. Second, patterns of opposition differ, 
among other characteristics, in concentration, competitiveness, 
relative decisiveness of site, distinctiveness, goals, and 
strategies. 25 
21Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," World Politics, Vol. 14, no. 2, (Jan. 
1969), p. 222. 
22Lijphart, p. 216. 
23Lijphart, p. 213. 
24Robert Dahl, Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1966), p. xi. 
25Dahl, p. 347. 
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Finally, on the issue of the specific nature of political opposition which fit 
specific models of democracy, Dahl states in his conclusion that: 
To a question whether a standard pattern of opposition has 
developed in Western democracies, the answer is ... a confident 
no.26 
Dahl's comments speak of the wide range of opposition possibilities between 
the two extremes on the opposition/coalition continuum. At the other end of 
the scale from Shapiro and Jung's majoritarian concept, is Arend Lijphart's 
concept of consociational democracy. 
Lijphart's concept of consociational democracy is an attempt by elites of 
the system to provide for democratic stability. Lijphart contends that: 
The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so 
much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate 
joint effort by elites to stabilize the system. 27 
Giovani Sartori considers the opposition/coalition continuum in his book 
The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Remarking on the contribution of 
Lijphart's 'two models' of democracy, Sartori states: 
[H]is [Lijphart's] argument in favor of the consociational type of 
democracy is both forceful and faultless in its claim that 
segmented and deeply divided societies cannot be based on 
26Dahl, 348. 
27Lijphart, p. 213. 
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majority rule; their option is to be either consociational or not to 
be democracies at all.28 
It would be difficult to argue that South Africa was not a deeply divided society 
with severe cleavages set upon socio-economic, ethnic and racial lines. As such, 
Lijphart's model of consociational democracy seems to fit well with the current 
dispensation. 
Sartori's support for consociational democracy is based upon his own 
decision-making theory which considers the intensity of minorities in the 
decision making process. As such, Sartori notes that: 
The theory of consociational democracy addresses ... ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious minorities that are not only large 
minorities but also cleavage minorities (original emphasis), I 
mean, minorities defined (and upheld) by a particular structure of 
cleavages, namely by cumulative, reinforcing, and, specifically, 
"isolative" cleavages. 29 
Such cleavages are present in South Africa, which reinforces the need for 
consociational based democracy. 
Sartori continues his assessment of majoritarian democracy and 
consociational democracy by commenting that: 
[A]long a continuum whose polar ends are "always 
majoritarianism" or "never majoritarianism," the concrete 
democracies are likely to be all the more majoritarian the more 
they are consensual, homogeneous (culturally), and non-
28Giovani Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, New Jersey: 
Chatham House Publishers, 1987), p. 238. 
29Sartori, p. 238. 
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segmented (in their structure of cleavages), all the less 
majoritarian (i.e., consociational) the less these characteristics 
obtain. Somewhat differently restated, while we always find a 
blend of majoritarian and non-majoritarian decision, the 
proportions vary, and vary in response to this rule of thumb: The 
greater the presence of intense minorities, the less a zero-sum 
governing is advisable and democratically feasible. 30 
Sartori considers majoritarian democracy to be a zero-sum game. According to 
Sartori, majoritarian democracy is zero-sum in nature because of the 
confrontational decision making process between government and opposition 
where one side's win is the other side's loss.31 A consociational process, on the 
other hand, is a positive sum game where both sides can win through 
negotiated power-sharing decision making. 
Within the two models of democracy, there are also different models of 
opposition. The 'majoritarian' model of democracy requires a highly structured 
opposition (such as Shapiro and Jung support) in order to appeal for votes 
against the government and to criticise and serve as a check on the 
government. The consociational model of democracy does not require such 
formalised structuring of opposition because the participation of opposition 
interests is implicit within the model. 
30Sartori, p. 240. 
31This zero-sum is either the government policy being adopted (government wins), or 
the fall of the government as the result of a vote of non-confidence (opposition wins). 
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Within the South African context, the democratic model which is 
enshrined at the Cabinet level of government by the Constitution is the 
consociational model. As such there are no formal structures for opposition. 
The question to ask, then, is whether Shapiro and Jung's concern for 
institutionalised opposition in South Africa is warranted, or whether Lijphart's 
consociational model offers sufficient opposition participation. 
The approach this paper will use to examining the above stated question 
is by looking at the three related reasons for the importance of opposition 
which are outlined by Shapiro and Jung, and to identify whether they may be 
accomplished under South Africa's consociational regime. This paper will 
return to an assessment of South Africa's Parliamentary ability to fulfil these 
requirement in Chapter VII, after the structures of opposition are examined. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENTARY 
INSTITUTIONS OF OPPOSITION 
In order to examine the institutions of South Africa's Parliament, it is 
necessary to examine the rules which govern the operation of these 
institutions. This paper will examine three institutions within the South 
African Parliamentary system: Cabinet; the National Assembly; and, 
Parliamentary Committees. For each of these institutions, the rules and 
procedures will be examine, and the theoretical capabilities of opposition 
politics will be analysed. There are two basic documents which proscribe the 
rules of procedure for the institutions of Parliament which are studied in this 
paper. The first document is the Interim Constitution; which details the 
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structure of Parliament and each institutions competencies. The second 
document is the Standing Rules of the National Assembly and for Joint 
Business and Proceedings of the National Assembly and the Senate; which 
details the procedural rules of these institutions. The first section of this 
chapter will examine the institutional structures, rules, and procedures which 
are provided in these two documents. 
The second section of this chapter will examme the path of policy 
creation and formation within the Parliamentary structures. An analysis of 
the path of the policy through the institutions which are studied in this paper 
will enable a more complete understanding of how important the various 
institutions are within the overall area of policy formulation. 
SECTION I 
RULES AND PROCEDURES 
Cabinet 
The only rules and procedures for the operation of South Africa's 
Cabinet which have been publicly acknowledged are those which are provided 
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in the Interim Constitution and the Standing Rules for the National Assembly. 
Section 88 of the Constitution describes the nature of the Cabinet: 
88. (1) The Cabinet shall consist of the President, the Executive 
Deputy Presidents and not more than 27 Ministers appointed by 
the President in accordance with this section. 
(2) A party holding at least 20 seats in the National Assembly 
and which has decided to participate in the government of 
national unity, shall be entitled to the allocation of one or more of 
the Cabinet portfolios in proportion to the number of seats held by 
it in the National Assembly relative to the number of seats held 
by the other participating parties.32 
In addition to the structure of Cabinet, and describing which parties are to be 
entitled to participate in Cabinet, the Constitution also mandates the 
procedure of Cabinet as follows: 
89. (2) The Cabinet shall function in a manner which gives 
consideration to the consensus-seeking spirit underlying the 
concepts of a government of national unity as well as the need for 
effective government. 33 
Furthermore, the Constitution details the accountability of Ministers and 
Cabinet in Section 92, which states: 
92. (1) A Minister shall be accountable individually both to the 
President and to Parliament for the administration of the 
portfolio entrusted to him or her, and all members of the Cabinet 
shall correspondingly be accountable collectively for the 
performance of the functions of the national government and for 
its policies. 34 
32Republic of South Africa, Minister of Constitutional Development, Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Bill, [B 212D-93 (GA)], p. 54. 
33Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, p. 54. 
34Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, p. 54. 
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These Constitutional provisions for the structure and procedure of the Cabinet 
are the only public document which detail how Cabinet is to operate. The 
standing rules and operating procedure of Cabinet meetings are as secret as 
the deliberations and discussions which take place within those meetings. 
There are, however, a few procedural prescriptions for Ministers which are 
provided in the Standing Rules for The National Assembly. 
The Standing Rules contain two references to Ministers. The first 
reference concerns time limits for speeches. According to Rule 93 (a): 
93. (a) the President, an Executive Deputy President, the leader 
of the largest minority party and the member in charge of the 
business before a meeting, shall not be restricted in regard to the 
length of time they may speak. 35 
Generally, the "member in charge of the business before a meeting'' refers to 
the Minister in charge of the portfolio that the item under debate falls. This 
time limit, then, only applies to Ministers when they are speaking about bills 
which they bring before the house, and does not confer unlimited speaking 
times for other subject matters (which is the situation for the President, 
Executive Deputy Presidents, and the leader of the largest minority party (who 
happens also in this situation to the be Second Deputy President). 
35Republic of South Africa, Standing Rules for the National Assembly and for the 
Joint Business and Proceedings of the National Assembly and the Senate, June 1994, p. 25. 
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The other reference to Cabinet Ministers in the Standing Rules concerns 
interpellations and questions. Under Rule 191: 
191. (5) No interpellation or question may be addressed to any 
person other than a member of the Cabinet. 36 
Question and interpellations, be they written or oral, can only be put to 
Cabinet members, and it is the responsibility of the Cabinet Minister to 
respond to these questions. The purpose of questions and interpellations is to 
assure accountability of Ministers to Parliament, which is provided for in 
Section 92 of the Constitution, as was described above. 
The provisions for Cabinet which are detailed in the Constitution and 
the Standing Rules of the National Assembly set up a Cabinet which seems to 
be organised according to the Westminster Parliamentary system. The main 
characteristics are Ministers who are charged with the operation and 
superv1s1on of portfolios, and who are responsible to both Cabinet and 
Parliament for the operation of their portfolios. The difference, and the 
dominant characteristic is the consociational nature of intra-Cabinet relations 
which is mandated by the Constitution. The Constitutionally mandated 
inclusion of minority parties which achieve a certain level of representation in 
the National Assembly creates a coalition style government even in the 
36 Republic of South Africa, Standing Rules of the National Assembly, p. 48. 
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absence of natural coalition forces. That is to say that small parties are not 
included (and accommodated) for the sake of achieving a parliamentary 
majority and securing the confidence of the government. On the contrary, the 
inclusion of smaller parties is unnatural and the coalition relationship is 
mandated by law (the Constitution) rather than necessity. 
National Assembly 
Like Cabinet, the Parliamentary institution of the National Assembly is 
structured by the Interim Constitution. Provisions of the constitution which 
may have an effect on the functioning of parliamentary opposition are Sections 
43(b) and 67. Section 43(b) states: 
43. (b) A member of the National Assembly shall vacate his or her 
seat if he or she ceases to be a member of the party which 
nominated him or her as a member of the National Assembly.37 
The prov1s1on for expulsion provided by this section of the constitution 
proscribes the Parliamentary action of 'crossing the floor' in support of a 
different political party. Additionally, this provision sets the foundation for 
absolute party control of its members in the National Assembly. If a caucus 
member steps out of line, theoretically, party membership can be withdrawn 
and that member could be removed from Parliament. 
37Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, p. 26. 
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Section 67 of the Constitution provides for the transparency of 
Parliamentary structures, the National Assembly in particular. It states: 
67. Sittings of the National Assembly or the Senate and joint 
sitting of the National Assembly and the Senate shall be held in 
public, and the public, including the media, shall have access to 
such sittings38 
Other procedures for the behaviour of Members of Parliament are 
described in the Standing Rules. Rules 93, 117, 152, and 191 all have possible 
implications on the ability of MPs and political parties to carry out opposition 
politics. Rule 93 provides that "members ... may not speak for longer than 10 
minutes at a time on a vote in the schedule."39 Rule 117 outlines the procedure 
for Divisions in the National Assembly. Rule 117 states: 
117. (1) Whenever a question is put by the presiding officer, any 
member may, instead of demanding a division, inform the 
presiding officer that he or she wishes his or her opposition or 
that of the party to which he or she belongs to b formally recorded 
in the Minutes of Proceedings. 
(2) The presiding officer may order that a division take place in 
the even of four or more members wishing to record their 
individual opposition.40 
Rule 152 concerns the addition of amendments by members to bills which are 
being considered. The Rule states: 
152. (1) (a) A member may, after a bill has been placed on the 
Order paper for Second Reading but before this House has taken 
38Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, p. 38. 
39Republic of South Africa, Standing Rules for the National Assembly, p. 25. 
40Republic of South Africa, Standing Rules for the National Assembly, p. 31. 
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a decision thereon, place amendments to the clauses of the bill on 
the Order Paper. 
(b) A bill that has not been agreed to by the committee which 
considered it may not be amended under this Rule.41 
Rules 191 to 202 concern the use of questions and interpellations m the 
National Assembly. Under the rules, notice must be given, and the questions 
and interpellations must be submitted beforehand. Additionally, the rules 
stipulate that a member may ask only two oral question per day (Rule 198 (2)), 
and only three written question per Parliamentary working week (Rule 201 
(3)). 
The rules and procedures which govern the National Assembly generally 
set the stage for debate (time limits), Ministerial questioning (questions and 
interpellations), amending power, and divisions. 
Parliamentary Committees 
The Constitution, in setting out the structures of Parliament, includes a 
provision for the establishment of committees. Section 58 of the Constitution 
states: 
58. (1) The National Assembly of the Senate may make rules and 
orders in connection with the conduct of its business and 
proceeding, and the National Assembly and the Senate may make 
joint rules and orders in connection with the conduct of their joint 
business and proceedings, including rules and orders regulating-
41Republic of South Africa, Standing Rules for the National Assembly, p. 41. 
A Neo-Institutional Analysis of Opposition Structures in the South African Parliament 
The South African Parliamentary Institutions of Opposition 
Pae 27 
(a) the establishment, constitution, powers and functions, 
procedures and duration of committees of Parliament; 
(b) restrictions on access to such committees; 
(c) the competency of any such committee to perform or 
dispose of its business and proceedings at venues other 
than the Houses of Parliament ... 
(2) For the purposes of exercising its powers and performing its 
functions, any committee established under subsection (l)(a) shall 
have the power to summon persons to appear before it to give 
evidence on oath or affirmation and to produce any documents 
required by it, and to receive representations from interested 
persons.42 
Following the Constitutional provisions for the establishment of rules, the 
Standing Rules of the National Assembly contains extensive regulations for the 
establishment and procedures of committees. Rules 34 through 69 regulate 
committees. The primary rules which govern committees set the number of 
members that may sit on a committee, as well as the jurisdiction of 
committees. A significant rule which affects the operation of opposition is Rule 
63 which states: 
63. It shall not be competent for a select committee to present a 
minority report. 43 
Since it is not possible for committees to present minority reports, the views 
and concerns of the minority members of committees will not be acknowledged 
42Republic of South Africa, Constitution for the Republic of South Africa Bill, p. 34. 
43Republic of South Afrrca, Standing Rules for the National Assembly,, p. 21. 
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when the committee reports back to the National Assembly on its assessment 
of the bill under consideration. 
There is a peculiar characteristic of the rules and procedures which 
govern the National Assembly and the Committees when they are compared to 
the rules of the Cabinet. While Cabinet is constitutionally mandated to 
"function in a manner which givers consideration to the consensus-seeking 
spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity,"44 there are no 
such provision for the behaviour and function of the National Assembly. 
The three institutions of South Africa's Parliament are governed by 
different sets of rules. In addition to the above noted discrepancy between the 
procedures of Cabinet and the National Assembly and committees, the 
noticeable trait of the South African dispensation is the lack of opposition 
structures. Not only is there no provision for opposition structures, but rules 
such as Section 43(b) of the Constitution which prevents members from 
crossing the floor and Rule 63 of the Standing Rules of the National Assembly 
which prohibits a minority committee report seem to seek to prevent opposition 
politics from forming at all. The non-provision of opposition structures is only 
exacerbated by the provision of rules which prevent other opposition 
manoeuvres. 
44Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, p. 54. 
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The expectation for opposition politics, based upon a theoretical analysis 
of the rules and procedure which govern the institutions of Parliament, must 
be minimal at best. It seems as though there are two models of democracy 
functioning within the South African Parliamentary institutions. Lijphart's 
consociational model of democracy is firmly entrenched in Cabinet, both in 
form and function. However, there is a danger at the National Assembly and 
committee level where the constitutional mandated consociational behaviour is 
notably absent. The unique nature of a mandated, rather than natural, 
coalition style government at the Cabinet level is not continued through the 
other institutions of Parliament.45 In the other two institutions which are 
examined, the majoritarian model of democratic rule is in effect, however 
without the necessary formal structures for opposition politics. 
The opposition politics expected, the, varies by parliamentary 
institution. At the Cabinet level, Lijphart's consociational model of democracy 
is constitutionally entrenched. This creates minority party inclusion in 
decision making; a "cartel of elites." In the National Assembly, there are no 
45A natural coalition would be one where minorities parties are invited to join the 
government one of the dominant parties of Parliament. Natural coalitions are formed when no 
one party has a majority in Parliament, and so additional seats are required to insure the 
stability and confidence of the government. Natural coalition members are able to exert 
considerable leverage because their dissatisfaction with government policy could cause them to 
leave the government coalition, which may in turn cause the government to fall as the result of 
a vote of no-confidence. 
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formal opposition structures, yet the rules of procedure do allow for smaller 
party participation in debates and question period. Procedure at the 
committee level, similar to the National Assembly, operates under a 
majoritarian model of democracy. Prohibition of minority reports, and a lack of 
mandated co-operation, combined with under-representation of minority 
parties suggests that opposition politics will not be a large factor at the 
committee level. Since the National Assembly is the only institution where the 
smaller parties have some procedures which allow for their participation, it 
may be expected the they will use these procedures to their full potential. 
SECTION II 
PATH OF POLICY FORMULATION 
The role of opposition politics may be observed by exploring the path of 
policy formation in Parliament from start to finish; and exploring the 
institutional role in policy formation. 
Government policy is conceived at the Cabinet level. Bills and proposals 
are put forth by the relevant ministries for Cabinet approval. Therefore, 
opposition parties may play an important role in the shaping of proposals and 
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policies in the Cabinet. The consociational nature of Cabinet allows for power-
sharing and consensus building in government policy proposals. 
Once Cabinet has approved a draft proposal, the relevant Minister will 
submit the proposal to Parliament on the first reading of the Bill. During the 
first reading debate, the principles and processes of the proposal are briefly 
debated before the bill is referred to committee. 
After the first reading, the bill is referred to a committee for report. 
After consideration and the creation of a committee report, the Bill is presented 
to the National Assembly for the second reading of the bill and the report of the 
committee. During the second reading of the bill, the entire National 
Assembly considers and debates the bill, as well as any amendments which the 
committee recommends. During this debate, members of the National 
Assembly are able to submit their own amendments to the bill under 
consideration. Following the second reading, and the debate the bill under 
consideration is referred back to the committee if there are any amendments 
which have been offered and accepted by the National Assembly. The 
committee is then responsible to consider the bill as well as the amendments, 
and to submit a report back to the National Assembly. Once the bill, as well as 
amendments, are considered by the committee and referred back to the 
National Assembly, the National Assembly votes to accept the second reading 
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of the bill. The process of sending amended versions of the bill back to the 
committee for consideration can only occur once.46 
The third reading of the bill is the final reading, and the members of the 
National Assembly vote to either pass or defeat the bill (no amendments may 
be made after the second reading is accepted). After the third reading of the 
Bill, if Parliament votes to pass the bill, it is sent to the President for assent. 
Section 64 of the Constitution states: 
64. (1) A Bill duly passed by Parliament in accordance with this 
Constitution shall be assented to by the President subject to 
section 82(1)(b). 
It is unclear if the Presidential assent is to be undertaken with the same 
consideration as Cabinet procedure. If so, then it would b expected that the 
minority parties would be able to influence (to a degree) this final process of 
policy formation. This influence would allow for minority participation in the 
last 'veto point' of the process--an important consideration. If Presidential 
assent does not operate under the guise of Cabinet procedure, then the 
minority parties will be excluded from this last 'veto point,' and the President's 
46Rule 152 (7). Republic of South Africa, Standing Rules for the National Assembly, p. 
41. 
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party (the majority ANC) can be expected to practice a freer hand in policy 
changes outside of Cabinet. 
CHAPTER V 
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S 
INSTITUTIONS OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION 
The institutional structure of South Africa's Parliament creates 
expectations, based upon theoretical operation, of certain patterns of 
participation of the political parties. The Interim Constitution fails to provide 
structures for opposition participation and expectations based solely on the 
Constitution (Shapiro and Jung) could discount opposition. However, there are 
other rules which regulate the behaviours in Parliament. In the National 
Assembly, the Standing Rules of Procedure allow minority parties to 
participate in debate and to submit questions. The interaction of these two 'set 
of rules' in addition to standards and norms of the Parliamentary system 
creates an institutional background of greater opposition (minority) party 
participation. 
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In order to compare theoretical expectations to empirical realities, 
statistics have been developed on National Assembly debate. These statistics 
seeks to establish the level of participation of the parties of Parliament in the 
National Assembly. Once established, comparisons can be made between 
theoretical expectations and empirical reality. 
METHODOLOGY 
For purposes of this paper, the Hansard transcripts of National 
Assembly debates were analysed. Numbers 1 through 7 of the Hansard, 
covering 9 May through 1September1994 are used.47 
Three attributes were measured from the Hansard: party size as of 1 
September; number of questions asked per party as of 1 September; and, the 
number of columns of debate per party as of 1 September. 
The party size as of 1 September is available on page 14 of Number 7 of 
the Hansard debates. The number of questions asked per party was calculated 
by indexing the sum of question asked by each member according to their 
political party. 
47Republic of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard), First Session-
First Parliament, Nos. 1-7. 
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The number of columns of debate per political party as of 1 September is 
calculated as the sum of the number of columns of debate for each party 
member. Debate is measured from the Hansard as follows: 
a.) the English version of the Hansard is used. 
b.) the text of each member's debate in the National Assembly is 
measured to the nearest .125 of a column in the Hansard volume. 
c.) for purposes of these measurements, only debates and speeches were 
used. Motions, the rulings of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker and 
interjections are not measured. 
d.) were speeches were delivered in languages other than English or 
Afrikaans, only the English translation is measured. 
The raw data collected from these measurements is contained in Appendix A of 
this paper. 
Cabinet information is recorded from page 1 of the Hansard Number 7. 
Cabinet statistics are measured as follows: 
a.) measured as of 1 September 1994. 
b.) only full Ministers are counted, not deputy-ministers. 
c.) the two Executive Deputy Presidents and the President are 
counted. 
Committee information is taken from a Parliamentary information 
package dated 1 October 1994. Two attributes are measured from the 
information package: the number of committee chairs per party; and, the 
number of committee seats per party. The number of seats per party is 
measured as follows: 
a.) only full members of committees are measured, not alternates. 
b.) sub-committees are not measured. 
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c.) if committee seats have been allocated to a party but are not filled, 
they are still counted as belonging to the allocated party. 
STATISTICS 
The percentage of party representation in the National Assembly is 
calculated as the number of seats held by a party divided by the total number 
of seats in the National Assembly (400). Accordingly, the representation of the 
parties in the National Assembly is as follows: 
ACDP: 0.5% ANC: 62.8% DP: 1.8% FF: 2.3% 
IFP: 10.8% NP: 20.5% PAC: 1.3% 
The number of questions asked by each party of the National Assembly 
is calculated as the sum of questions asked by members from each party. This 
sum is determined by the index of questions in volume 7 of Hansard. The 
breakdown of questions per party is: 
ACDP: 0 ANC: 60 DP: 63 FF: 5 
IFP: 50 NP: 34 PAC: 8 
The percentage of total questions asked per party is calculated by taking 
the number of questions asked by each party and dividing that number by the 
total number of questions (220). The percentage breakdown of questions by 
party is: 
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ACDP: 0 ANC: 27.3% DP: 28.6% FF: 2.3% 
IFP: 22.7% NP: 15.5% PAC: 3.6% 
The total debate columns of each party is calculated as the sum of the 
debate columns of all of the party's members. The total debate columns per 
political party are: 
ACDP: 14.5 ANC: 1161.0 DP: 90.25 FF: 91.25 
IFP: 221.125 NP: 476.25 PAC: 43.625 
The percentage of total debate per political party 1s calculated by 
dividing each individual party's debate total by the total number of measured 
debate columns in the National Assembly as of 1 September. The percentage 
breakdown of debate by party is: 
ACDP: 0.7% ANC: 55.4% DP: 4.3% FF: 4.3% 
IFP: 10.5% NP: 22.7% PAC: 2.1% 
The number of committee chairs per party is calculated as the sum of 
individual chairs allocated per party. The number of committee chairs by 
party is: 
ACDP: 0 ANC: 32 DP: 1 FF: 1 IFP: 1 
NP: 0 PAC: 0 
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The percentage of committee chairs held by each party is calculated as 
the number of chairs held by each individual party divided by the total number 
of committee chairs (32). The percentage of committee chairs per party is: 
ACDP: 0% ANC: 91.4% DP: 2.9% FF: 2.9% 
IFP: 2.9% NP: 0% PAC: 0% 
The total number of committee seats per party is the sum of the seats 
allocated to each party for each committee. The number of committee seats per 
party is: 
ACDP: 13 ANC: 402 DP: 32 FF: 32 IFP: 54 
NP: 131 PAC: 25 
The percentage of committee seats held by each party is the sum of seats 
allocated to each individual party divided by the total number of committee 
seats (689). The percentage of committee seats held by each party is: 
ACDP: 1.9% ANC: 58.3% DP: 4.6% FF: 4.6% 
IFP: 7.8% NP: 19% PAC: 3.6% 
The total number of Cabinet seats per party is the sum of the seats 
allocated to each party. The number of Cabinet seats for each party is: 
ACDP: 0 ANC: 20 DP: 0 FF: 0 
IFP: 3 NP: 7 PAC: 0 
A Neo-Institutional Analysis of Opposition Structures in the South African Parliament 
A Statistical Analysis of South Africa's Institutions of Political Opposition 
Pae 40 
The percentage of Cabinet seats held by each party is the sum of 
Cabinet seats allocated to each individual party divided by the total number of 
Cabinet seats plus the President and two Executive Deputy Presidents (30). 
The percentage of Cabinet seats held by each party is: 
ACDP: 0% ANC: 66.7% DP: 0% FF: 0% 
IFP: 10% NP: 23.3% PAC: 0% 
CORRELATION 
Once these statistics have been calculated, more sophisticated statistical 
analysis can be performed to learn more about the relations between party size 
and party performance. This paper will consider four correlations between two 
party attributes: party size and GNU participation; and two party behaviours: 
National Assembly debate participation and National Assembly question 
asking. 
The formula for calculating the correlation is: 
n L(xy)-(L x)(Ly) 
r = ----;:::::======-;::=::===== 
~n L(x2)-(Lx / ~n L(y2)-(LY / 
where n is the number of data points. 
size. 
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The correlation statistics are calculated to take into consideration party 
Correlation Results 
Party Size & National Assembly Debate: -0.18 
This results show that there is a weak negative correlation between 
party size and National Assembly debate participation. The larger the party 
size, the less National Assembly debate the party participated in (relative to 
the party's size). This correlation shows the propensity for smaller parties in 
the National Assembly to be over-represented in debates. 
GNU Participation & National Assembly Debate: -0.82 
This result shows that there is a strong negative correlation between 
membership in the GNU and proportional participation in National Assembly 
debates. As such, non-GNU membership shows a propensity for over-
representation in National Assembly debate participation. 
Party Size & Questions: -0.30 
This result shows that there is a moderate negative correlation between 
party size and question asking (once party size is factored in). This negative 
correlation shows the propensity for smaller parties to ask an over-
proportionate number of questions compared to their relative size. 
GNU Participation & Questions: -0.40 
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This final correlation result shows a moderate/strong negative 
correlation between GNU participation and question asking. The propensity 
is, then, for non-GNU members to ask an over-proportionate share of 
questions. 
GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION 
The following ten pages show graphical representation of the statistics 
which have been developed. Figures 1 and 2 show pie and bar graph 
representations of Party Representation in Parliament and Party Participation 
in debate. Of significance is the empirical reality which shows that the DP, 
FF, NP, ACDP and PAC all have Parliamentary participation greater than 
their respective proportion of seats. Such a finding shows that the rules and 
procedures of the National Assembly allow for small party participation, m 
most cases at levels greater than their proportion of seats. 
Figures 3 and 4 compare the percentage of seats in Parliament to the 
number and percentage of questions and interpellations for each party. In this 
case, the non-GNU parties all had over-proportionate question percentages 
(with the DP having the highest number) while the largest two partners in the 
GNU (the ANC and NP) had markedly less than proportionate question 
percentages. The IFP is the anomaly in this case, because it is a GNU 
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participant with an over-proportionate percentage of questions. Most of the 
IFP's questions can be attributed to one MP (Cassim), without whom the IFP 
falls into line with the other GNU parties. 
Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of committee chairs according to 
political party. Only the ANC, DP, FF, and IFP have committee chairs. The 
ANC dominance of committee chairs is considerably higher than its proportion 
of representation in the National Assembly. At the committee level it is 
obvious that the ANC is the dominant force. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the distribution of committee seats among all of 
the parties in parliament. The distribution of committee seats favours the 
smaller parties, with the ANC, NP and IFP having lower proportional 
representation at the committee level than they have in the National 
Assembly. 
Figures 9 and 10 show the distribution of Cabinet seats according to 
party. The distribution of Cabinet seats allows for a proportional 
representation of the GNU parties which is similar to the National Assembly 
representation of the three parties (although the IFP is slightly under-
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REFLECTION ON EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF 
THE ROLE OF OPPOSITION 
This chapter will examine the effect of the rules and institutions examined in 
Section I of Chapter IV on three distinct aspects of opposition politics. Emphasis will 
be placed upon both the theoretical expectations of opposition behaviour and the 
empirical realities experienced in Parliament. The first aspect which will be 
examined is the opposition of the smaller parties in Parliament (those which are not 
participating in government) to the GNU. The actions of the four small parties 
which are represented in Parliament but are not participating in the GNU can serve 
as a indicator for the institutional structures in Parliament which allow for 
opposition involvement. The second type of opposition which will be examined is 
political opposition between parities of the GNU itself. Since the ANC is the 
dominant parity within government, the type of opposition this section will be 
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concerned with is National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party based opposition 
toward the ANC. The final type of opposition examined in this chapter will be 
opposition politics within individual party caucuses. 
Using the foundations and structures of the three Parliamentary institutions 
of Cabinet, the National Assembly and Parliamentary Committees outlined in 
Section I of Chapter IV, this chapter will examine the effect of these rules and 
procedures on three aspects of Parliamentary opposition: opposition toward the 
Government of National Unity from the smaller parties; opposition between parties 
of the GNU; and, opposition within individual party caucuses. 
GNU & Smaller Parties 
The first aspect of political opposition which will be examined is the 
relationship between the government of national unity and the four small parities of 
Parliament. For the Freedom Front, the Democratic Party, the Pan Africanist 
Congress, and the African Christian Democratic Party, the rules and procedures of 
Cabinet are not very important as none of these parties has Cabinet level 
representation. 
Secondly, as Shapiro and Jung point out, there are no formal rights and 
responsibilities for 'non-GNU' parties outlined in the Constitution. The Standing 
Rules of the National Assembly, however, do provide for the operation of some level 
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of opposition politics in the form of participation in debate and the fielding of 
questions and interpellations. Empirically, the four small parties of Parliament 
occupy 23 seats, or 5.75% of Parliament. Yet, these parties (despite the ten minute 
speech time limit) have been able to participate in 11.4% of the debate. A 
breakdown by party, of National Assembly debate, shows: 
ACDP: 0. 7% DP: 4.3% FF: 4.3% PAC: 2.1% 
Questions and interpellations have also been used effectively by these four 
small parties. These four parties, which again occupy only 5.75% of Parliament, 
have been able to use the standing rules procedures to ask 34.5% of the questions 
and interpellations in Parliament. 
At the committee level, these four small parties are also drastically 
proportionally outnumbered. Interestingly, the DP and FF MPs chair two 
committees, or 5.8% of the committees. 
The party representation on committees is roughly proportional to their 
representation in Parliament, as well as mitigated by the ability of parties to 
allocate members from their limited ranks to the wide range of committee seats 
which may be available.48 As such, the four smaller parties have 102 out of 689 
committee seats (DP: 32, FF: 32, PAC: 25, ACDP: 32). Such small representation 
48Jn light of the fact that there are 34 committees with a total of 689 committee seats, it has 
been physically difficult for some of the smaller parties to participate on all of the committees that 
they have been allocated seats for because of the mere reality that the smaller parties do not have 
enough members to attend all of the committee meetings. 
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is further hampered by the standing rule restriction on minority reports from 
committees. As ANC MP Johannes H. de Lange points our "there are no 
constitutional rules for power-sharing in committees."49 Such an attitude on the 
part of members of the dominant party in Parliament and at the committee level 
does not bode well for the ability of the smaller parties to influence legislation in 
committees. 
The operation of Parliamentary opposition for the four non-GNU parties, 
then, seems to be best in the National Assembly. Institutionally, this is logical. 
These four parties are not represented in Cabinet, so their influence there is 
minimal at best. In committees, there is a mixed bag effect. The DP and FF do have 
some small ability to agenda set and influence legislation in the two committees that 
they chair, but their Members are so vastly outnumbered that this ability may not 
operationalise itself. Furthermore, the actions of the ANC caucus, especially de 
Lange, would indicate that the spirit of consensus does not rule committees. Within 
the ordinary majority rule situation, these four small parties could quickly become a 
seriously marginalised minority. 
In the National Assembly, however, these four parties (particularly the DP 
and FF) have been able to make themselves seen and heard. Although there are no 
49Chris Louw, "Back Bench Seizes the Cabinet Crown," in The Weekly Main & Guardian, Vol. 
10, no. 34, p. 10. 
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formal opposition structures, the standing rules do provide for debate time and 
questioning opportunities for all members. These four smaller parties have done 
themselves well by setting a precedent for the disproportional use of National 
Assembly debate and questions by small parties. It is unlikely that the present 
situation in the National Assembly would be much changed even if there were 
formal structures for opposition party participation. 
Opposition Between Parties of the GNU 
The second aspect of opposition that will be examined is political opposition 
between parties of the Government of National Unity itself. As the ANC is the 
dominant party within the government, this section will examine NP and IFP 
opposition towards the ANC. 
The party undergoing the sharpest crisis of identity and purpose is probably 
the National Party. The change from almost 40 years of government rule has not 
been easy, and the adjustment is still ongoing. As Executive Deputy President de 
Klerk states: 
The question is posed: Can we effectively engage our partners in the 
Government of National Unity as our opponents, while co-operating 
with them in government?50 
50Republic of South Africa, Debates of The National Assembly (Hansard), First Session-First 
Parliament, No. 3, 1 to 5 August 1994, Column 678. 
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Institutionally, both the NP and the IFP have found that Cabinet is the arena 
where they are able to exert the most influence. During negotiations leading up to 
the creation of the Interim Constitution, the NP government sought to shape the 
governing structure so that it would have influence in the executive branch of 
government, and to create a structure which de-emphasised the legislative role in 
government policy creation. Although Cabinet dominance has been the situation for 
the outset, there have been deliberate moves, particularly by ANC caucus members, 
to use legislative means (such as committees) to shape policy. Whereas Cabinet 
must proceed within the 'spirit underlying national unity'', no such prescriptions 
exist for the National Assembly and committees. Such a move towards the power of 
committees would have detrimental effects on the ability of both the NP and the IFP 
to influence policy. 
Within Cabinet the NP has six seats plus one Executive Deputy President, 
and the IFP has three seats. This representation, along with the mandated spirit of 
national unity, allows the NP and IFP to exert considerable influence on policy 
direction. The situation within the National Assembly is somewhat different, if only 
because of the breakdown in numbers. The NP has participated in 22. 7% of the 
debate (while holding only 20.5% of the seats. The corresponding numbers for the 
IFP are 10.5% of debate and 10.8% of seats. Perhaps the IFP (like the PAC and 
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ACDP) is under-represented in National Assembly debate more as a result of 
inexperience with parliamentary procedure than because oflack of opportunity. 
Similarly, both the NP and IFP have asked 38.2% (NP: 15.5%, IFP: 22. 7%) of 
questions and interpellations, which shows that the structures do exist for this form 
of opposition. 
It is at the committee level that the NP and IFP are least effective, because of 
both the ANC majority and the lack of opposition structures at this level. 
Surprisingly, the IFP chairs one committee while the NP has none. The breakdown 
of committee chairs, then, demonstrates the disintegration of opposition structures 
the further one moves from cabinet. At the Cabinet level, the non-ANC parties have 
33.3% of seats, within an atmosphere which mandates co-operation and 
consultation. In the National Assembly, non-ANC parties have 37.2% of the seats. 
The rules of procedure have crated an institution in which these same non-ANC 
parties have been able to participate in 44.6% of the debate. At the committee level, 
however, there is 41.7% non ANC representation, 8.6% non-ANC chairs, and there is 
no mandated co-operation. Trends of the ANC caucus to use committees to put their 
own stamp on policy do not bode well for opposition interests. 
Opposition within Party Caucuses 
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The third and final aspect of opposition which will be examined in this paper 
is intra-caucus political opposition. The caucuses of the small parties are too small 
to be considered (DP, FF, PAC, ACDP). The caucuses of the three parties which are 
participating in the GNU, on the other hand, help to provide interesting insight into 
the institutional structure of Parliament. Section 43 (b), which is highlighted above, 
creates the theoretical framework for strict party discipline. In actuality, however, 
we shall see that such discipline is not always the case. 
Each of the three GNU parties have different caucus strains which have been 
created as a result of the GNU structure. The IFP, with --- seats and 10.8% of 
Parliament, is an important part of the GNU. The main problem confronting the 
IFP seems to be developing a balance between government support and self identity. 
The IFP shares this situation with the other minority party of the GNU, the NP. 
An interesting situation which has developed within the IFP caucus threatens 
to create the first instance where section 43(b) is employed. IFP MP Lalitha Singh 
has been accused of lying about her university qualifications on her IFP membership 
forms.5 1 There have been repeated calls from within the IFP, and the IFP 
Parliamentary caucus, for her to submit her resignation, which she has so far 
51Farouk Chothia, "Is IFP MP a graduate?," in The Weekly Mail and Guardian, Vol. 10, no. 25, 
(June 24-30, 1994), p. 12. 
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refused to do. It is speculated that if she does not resign, her party membership may 
be withdrawn, and with it her position as a MP. 
The National Party caucus is the most organised and structured of the three 
GNU parties, which is probably the result of nearly 40 years of government rule. 
The opposition within the caucus, therefore is less a case of renegade MPs, and more 
an internal debate over the form and function of the National Party under the new 
dispensation. The party is faced with the dilemma of how to create its own identity 
while co-operating within the GNU, and at the same time functioning as an 
opposition to the ANC. The institutional structures of Parliament make the NP's 
position a difficult one, but there seems to be an emergence of a rhetorical split 
between the party elite and back-benchers. For political and rhetorical purposed, 
FW de Klerk leads the party elite in promoting co-operation and consultative 
governance. Back benchers, lead by Andrew Fourie, have used the National 
Assembly debates and question periods to criticise the ANC's proposals and policies. 
Such a split may help the NP to achieve both of its goals, while the party discipline 
of the caucus assures that the party will support the GNU as long as the leaders do. 
The ANC is faced with its own unique situation. Its co-operation within the 
GNU is not the result of a natural coalition, but rather Constitutionally based. As 
such, there is concern within the ANC caucus that the small parties are wielding too 
much influence vis-a-vis their proportional strength. The shift of power to 
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parliamentary committees is the result of ANC caucus members who are seeking to 
move policy making to the caucus level and bring it away from the elite circles of 
Cabinet. 
The ANC has also been the subject of its fair share of internal wrangling. 
Cyril Ramaphosa's 'Code of Conduct,' which had to be signed by all ANC MPs was 
based on ethical grounds. It also, however, contains clauses which Weekly Mail 
Parliamentary correspondent Chris Louw suggests: 
is a strategic move by Ramaphosa to win back the initiative from both 
his cabinet colleagues and backbenchers in the ANC caucus who were 
planning to assert themselves through the parliamentary standing 
committees52 
Part of the code of conduct states that ANC MPs will not "attempt to make use of 
parliamentary structures to undermine organisational decisions and policies."53 
If the code is effective in establishing a further set of institutional rules at the 
ANC caucus level, this could obstruct plans to introduce private members bills. The 
code could also stem the flow of power to committees as it may obstruct plans to 
amend legislation substantially in committees as a way of sidelining Cabinet. 
The basis for intra-caucus opposition, especially within the ANC and the NP, 
is a dissatisfaction on the part of some caucus members with the status quo. ANC 
52Chris Louw, "Behind the code lies Cyril's bid to win power," in The Weekly Main & 
Guardian, Vol 10, no. 27, (Sept. 16-22, 1994), p. 6. 
53Jbid. 
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caucus members feel that the minority parties are too influential in government 
policy formulation. Additionally, some ANC caucus members are growing resentful 
of the top down nature of policy formulation which sees Cabinet (where the minority 
parties are more influential) submitting pre-formulated policies for what is perceived 
as rubber stamp approval. Within the NP, the debate surrounds the party's role 
within government and as opposition. Some caucus members feel that the NP is 
becoming too close to the ANC, and in the process is loosing its own identity. 
Both the ANC and the NP caucuses show similar cleavages. In both parties 
there are differences in opinion between the party elite and the caucus back-
benchers. It could even be posited that the leaders of the NP and ANC share a 
common co-operative mentality whereas there is a tendency for the back-benchers to 
be more confrontational. 
CHAPTER VII 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S 
INSTITUTIONS OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION 
The realities of parliamentary opposition in the South African Parliament, 
then, are considerably different than the theoretical expectations (for example those 
outlined in Shapiro and Jung). This difference can be attributed to the institutions, 
and rules thereof, of the Parliament, and how these institutions and rules affect the 
behaviour of the actors within the system. This chapter will examine the operation 
of South Africa's parliamentary opposition structures within a comparative analysis 
with the theories of political opposition which were examined in Chapter 3. In doing 
so, this chapter will show that despite the lack of formalised constitutional 
opposition institutionalisation, opposition politics do exist and are effective in South 
Africa's Parliament. 
Reflecting back on the results of Chapter V, this paper has detailed the 
channels though which opposition is operating in South Africa. As such, South 
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Africa's Parliamentary opposition has attributes from several of the available 
theoretical paradigms. The process and procedures in Cabinet fall within Lijphart's 
consociational model. The institutions of the National Assembly and Committees, 
however, can be more strongly identified under the majoritarian model of democracy. 
As such, this paper shall now return to the question which was asked above m 
Chapter III. The question which was asked, and which will now be examined, is 
whether Shapiro and Jung's concern for institutionalized opposition in South Africa 
is warranted, or whether Lijphart's consociational model offers sufficient opposition 
participation. 
Reviewing Shapiro and Jung's three functional concerns of opposition this 
chapter of the paper will show that the functions of opposition identified by Shapiro 
and Jung are operationalised in South Africa's Parliament by virtue of the blending 
of different models of democracy which set the rules which govern the institutions of 
the South African Parliament. 
The first function of the opposition identified by Shapiro is the "provision of 
the institutional space for opposition is necessary to ensure that discontent and 
dissatisfaction can be directed at particular governments rather than at the 
democratic regime."54 Currently, many organs, both within and outside of 
54fan Shapiro and Courtney Jung, South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy and 
Opposition in Comparative Perspective, (Institution for Social and Policy Studies Working Paper No. 
1052, Yale University, 1994), p. 4. 
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government structures, make a point of differentiating between the ANC-led 
Government of National Unity (GNU) and the democratic regime in South Africa. 
Criticism and praise is generally focused on specific members of the government or 
towards specific parities. Even within parliament itself there are, albeit a limited 
number, parties and members who are not part of the GNU. These smaller parties 
in parliament which are not participating in the government also make the point 
perfectly clear that they are operating out side of the government, but within the 
governance structures of South Africa. 
The over-proportional participation of smaller parties in the National 
Assembly debates show that there is even within the structures of governance strong 
identification and differentiation between the GNU and non-GNU parties. These 
smaller parties are operating within the regime and by virtue of doing so they are 
differentiating themselves from the government. 
The second reason identified by Shapiro 1s that "Opposition institutions 
matter .. .if the peaceful turnover of power from one elected government to another is 
the sine qua non of democratic politics as Huntington suggests."55 There are two 
issues which can be raised here. First, by participating openly in the governing 
process, the parties and members which are in the GNU do have "a whip system, a 
55Shapiro and Jung, p. 5. This passage is in reference to Samuel Huntington, The Third 
Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 
p. 267. 
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shadow cabinet, access to security briefings, and civil service support [which] are all 
necessary for an opposition to be, and to be perceived as, a realistic alternative to the 
government of the day."56 In the South African case, the NP and the IFP have a 
whip system. They do not have a shadow cabinet, but their participation in the 
Government provides them with access to security briefings. Additionally, the NP 
and IFP do not have civil service support, except in cases where one of their 
members head a state department. 
The consociational model of democracy which prevails in Cabinet allows for 
the strong influence of minority (opposition) parties within the government itself. It 
remains to be seen, and indeed presents a challenge to each of the parties 
participating in the GNU, how the parties will be able to present themselves as 
realistic alternatives for the next election. This paper has outlined the identity 
problems and the operational problems which GNU membership places on the 
National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Within each of the two parties, 
however, there is recognition of the problem of opposition within co-operation, and 
the parties are attempting to ensure that they are perceived as parties which are 
separate from the ruling ANC for electoral purposes. 
The second issue concerns those parties not participating in the GNU. 
Shapiro and Jung's concern is well founded, considering that there are not 
56Shapiro and Jung, p. 5. 
• 
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institutionalized constitutional provision for the participation of parties not in the 
government. It is reassuring to note that the rules and procedures which have been 
developed do allow for the participation in debates and questions of the small non-
government parties. Such guidelines, which are entrenched in the Constitution and 
Standing Rules, shape the institution of the National Assembly in such a manner as 
to insure that smaller parties of Parliament are able to participate. The 
participation of these parties has in fact been over-proportional to their actual size, 
which is a welcome situation for opposition politics. 
The final point raised by Shapiro is that the "existence of opposition 
institutions creates and empowers groups and individuals who have an interest in 
asking awkward questions, shining light in dark places, and exposing abuses of 
power"57 Again, although this function is not explicitly provided for in the 
Constitution, we have seen its de facto practice. In the South African situation 
healthy debate within parliament has certainly occurred between members of the 
government and the smaller parties. Additionally, and perhaps surprisingly, we 
have seen serious debate between the members of the different parties which are in 
the government. There seems to be, at least presently, a high degree of calling for 
accountability. Question period has been well used by the small parties in 
Parliament, as the statistics outlined above show. 
57Shapiro and Jung, p. 6. 
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The three functions of opposition which are highlighted by Shapiro and Jung 
are certainly operational in the South African Parliament. This does not, however, 
mean that the concerns which were put forth were ill-placed. The mixture of 
consociational and majoritarian democracy in South Africa's parliamentary 
institutions allow for opposition politics of different types within the different 
institutions. In Cabinet, the consociational procedures are enshrined in the 
Constitution. In the National Assembly, the ability of the smaller parties to serve as 
opposition is the result of the Standing Rules of the National Assembly which can be 
amended by the Rules Committee which is ANC dominated. Additionally, there 
have been recent attempts and moves towards sidelining the consociational Cabinet 
procedures in favour of legislative means of policy shaping. These legislative means 
are dominated by one party, and one party only, the ANC. So, while opposition 
politics do currently function within the South African Parliament, their position 
therein is not necessarily secure. As such, the concerns which were put forth by 
Shapiro and Jung, while they can be temporarily allayed, are valid and the 
entrenchment of opposition structures is still a crucial issue. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has examme the nature of opposition structures in the South 
African Parliament from a neo-institutional perspective. In doing so, it has 
examined the rules and procedures which define the rules under which the 
parliamentary actors must operate. Using the neo-institutional emphasis on how 
institutions shape the behaviour of the actors within institutional systems, this 
paper has shown how opposition politics operate within three Parliamentary 
institutions: Cabinet; the National Assembly, and Parliamentary committees. 
Two democratic models were examined in this paper: majoritarianism and 
Lipjhart's notion of consociationalism. This paper has shown the peculiar situation 
of the South African Parliament whereby the different institutions are modelled 
according to different theories of democratic governance. The procedure of Cabinet 
is consociational, a characteristic which is enshrined by the Constitution. The 
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National Assembly and parliamentary committees, on the other hand, operate 
according to the majoritarian model of democratic governance. In this case, the 
concerns for the lack of opposition structures (raised by Shapiro and Jung) are valid 
for the National Assembly and committees. Although both of these institutions are 
operating under the majoritarian model of democracy, they both lack the necessary 
formal institutional structures for opposition politics. 
The analysis of institutions for opposition within Parliament first considered 
the theoretical expectations for behaviour that the institutional rules would suggest. 
Subsequently, this paper presented an analysis of the empirical realities which exist 
in the South African Parliament. As was expected, opposition politics operate much 
considerably more than Shapiro and Jung would suggest. Within Cabinet, a 
consociational model of democracy includes substantial minority parties in the 
decision making process. In the National Assembly, the Standing Rules of 
Procedure allow for smaller party participation in debate and question period at 
levels greater than their proportional numbers. At the committee level, opposition 
politics is at its weakest. Although the larger parties are slightly under-represented, 
the committees operate under a majoritarian model of democracy. Additionally, 
such opposition structures as a minority committee report are prohibited. 
The nature of opposition politics in parliament differs substantially from one 
institution to the next. The relative strength and effect of opposition differs as well. 
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Cabinet is the locus of the most significant opposition influence, due to its 
consociational model. As the focus of analysis moves away from Cabinet, the 
strength and effect of opposition influence decreases. In the National Assembly, 
there is significant participation by the smaller parties. This participation, however, 
is not as influential as that of the minority parties in Cabinet. And finally, in the 
parliamentary committees, opposition strength is at its nadir. The majoritarian 
model coupled with a lack of significant opposition structures marginalises the 
power of the opposition. Interestingly, as the analysis of institutions moves away 
from the consociationalism of Cabinet, the ability and strength of opposition politics 
weakens. This is perhaps the result of National Party concentration on Cabinet 
structures when it was negotiating for a consociational model of governance. By 
ignoring the roles of the National Assembly and committees in policy formulation, 
the National Party may have made a serious mistake in its failure to negotiate of 
structured institutionalized opposition. 
Finally, although there are no formal structures of opposition within the 
South African Parliament, opposition politics do operate. By examining the 
institutions and the rules thereof, this paper has shown that whether it is by virtue 
of the consociational nature of Cabinet, or the over-representation of smaller parties 
in National Assembly debate opposition politics are an important part of the 
parliamentary process in South Africa. 
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